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Abstract— Cyber security education is now an essential piece 
of information to understand the current challenges in utilizing 
the technology in a secure manner. In this paper, we highlight the 
need of improving the human factors role and cyber security 
awareness in better securing the systems. We discuss a simulation 
tool called CPSA that can be used for education and training 
purposes to understand the impact of cyber-attacks on the 
physical power system, and overall system monitoring. The tool 
supports attacks modeling, different communication network 
topologies, simulation of bad data and malicious command 
received over the insecure network. This tool is helpful for 
students and researchers’ education to better understand the 
logics and prepare them with skills to evaluate the future cyber-
physical system security. The tool can also be used for training 
purpose to the technical and non-technical staff at power utility.   
Keywords—cyber-attacks; cyber-physical system; cyber 
education; training and awareness programme; smart grid 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Nowadays, understanding cyber security is extremely 
important and is required due to the nature of attacks targeted 
on different systems in almost all sectors by the cyber 
criminals. The attackers in the cyber-world try to breach data 
stored in the modern systems [1]. Considering this threat 
environment, cyber security education has become an essential 
part of our life to conduct day-to-day activities. As we live in a 
society, which is reforming itself smarter day-to-day. In this so 
called “smart world”, we are expecting billions of devices in 
the future connected to the Internet. This scenario invites 
security vulnerabilities and threats around the world [2]. 
Understanding and applying cyber security are becoming more 
and more difficult as these threats evolve with the advanced 
technologies. It is even harder to understand the impact of these 
cyber-attacks on the physical systems considering the fact that 
nowadays, we have several physical systems connected to the 
Internet exchanging information over the insecure network. A 
smart grid is an example of such systems. 
Many times, these systems are compromised due to the 
weak security implementation or by human mistakes due to not 
having sufficient understanding. Human factor in cyber 
security places an important role that can prioritize solutions 
for users to improve the cyber resiliency. Federal Information 
Systems Security Educators’ Association (FISSEA) 
highlighted that in order to have a secure infrastructure, an 
organization needs to address human factors of cyber security 
by the informed and proactive workforce [1]. The major cyber 
risks occur due to data breaches due to mostly human errors or 
negligence, which lead to data as well as financial losses. In 
order to improve human factor aspects to defeat cyber-attacks, 
we need to get involved in cyber workforce development, 
training and awareness, and stakeholder and leadership 
engagement. 
The power industry has recently faced potential cyber-
attacks around the world that impacted the power grid with 
serious implications. Some of these recent cyber-attacks 
targeted real power systems were: Ukraine attacks in December 
2015 and February 2016 [3]. The Ukraine power grid was 
brought down by cyber-attacks, which left 80,000 people in 
dark for more than six hours, and more than two months post-
attack, the control centers were still not fully operational [3]. 
The attacks targeted IT staff and system administrators of 
companies responsible for distributing electricity. They 
delivered email to workers with a malicious Word document 
attached. Clicking on and selecting the attachment enabled 
macros in the document, which actually injected BlackEnergy, 
a Trojan horse, (which have infected other systems in Europe 
and the US) into the workers’ machines. The attackers accessed 
the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 
networks through the hijacked Virtual Private Networks 
(VPNs), sent commands to disable the Uninterruptible Power 
Supply (UPS) systems, and opened up transmission line 
breakers at several substations. This caused a broad power 
blackout. It is evident that well planned and well-executed 
cyber-attacks through malicious control commands can 
potentially disconnect power devices at substations and leave 
hundreds of thousands of energy consumers in the dark. This 
scenario reflects a strong need of improving the security 
awareness of the operator and other staff at utility to protect the 
overall system. Human mistakes are one of the major issues in 
security breach, therefore, we need an education, training, and 
awareness programme to train them and make them aware 
about the recent cyber-attacks and best practices. At the same 
time, we need to improve cyber security awareness to the 
general public through several events, as well as enhance 
education with latest technological advancements and future 
challenges at universities and schools. This will prepare 
university students and researchers with skills to develop new 
tools and techniques to evaluate the impact of potential cyber-
attack, especially on a physical system.  
A reliable and secure smart grid system is required to build. 
This can be initiated by providing in-depth education related to 
cyber security and smart grid system operations to the 
university students and researchers. The other aspect is to 
develop new simulation tools to improve better understanding 
of the system behavior and provide a training and awareness to 
technical as well as non-technical staff of the power utilities to 
mitigate the risks and under attacks circumstances. We actually 
need to look at the tools that could provide a continuous, 
efficient and real-time monitoring along with cyber-physical 
security assessment for increased situational awareness. The 
ideal training should involve all three factors to think about: (i) 
how to prevent these attacks from happening, (ii) how can we 
detect these attacks and vulnerabilities, and (iii) what is the 
worst case consequence if we are not able to protect the system 
against (i) and (ii). 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
describes objectives, existing solutions and contributions of 
cyber-physical security tool in education and training. Section 
III highlights the cyber-physical system security challenges in 
education and training. Section IV explains the contextual 
learning requirements, whereas the Section V describes 
utilizing simulation tool in education and training. Finally, 
Section VI concludes this paper. 
II. OBJECTIVES, EXISTING SOLUTIONS, AND 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
In order to clearly provide better understanding and 
required knowledge to the university students and training to 
the utility staff, we must have a tool that covers several aspects 
of the cyber-physical system. In fact, to evaluate the current 
security of the power system, a cyber-physical security 
assessment of the joint communication-power system is 
required, rather than simply examining the cyber-security 
concerns in only the communication network or the impact of 
physical events on the power system. However, research in this 
area has not been fully explored. In summary, we have set the 
following objectives for the required education and training: 
1. Awareness for power operators who do not understand 
cyber security, but deal with the system under attack. 
2. Training programme for utility staff, including electrical 
engineers and IT professionals for better understanding 
the nature of cyber-attacks and their impact on the power 
system. 
3. Point (1) and (2) are required to include in the education 
system for university students and researchers to design 
new tools and develop better techniques to cover all said 
aspects of the integrated cyber-physical system. 
In subsequent paragraphs, we discuss the existing solutions 
to defeat some of the cyber-attacks. This will reflect the current 
state of the art in the education system as well as in the training 
and awareness programme, and will help to find unresolved 
problems and security issues in the smart grid system. 
Tran et al. proposed a detection scheme for a replay attack 
in the smart grid [4]. Chen et al. discussed different categories 
of attacks: vulnerability, data injection and intentional attacks, 
and analyzed communication network robustness [5]. Yang et 
al. discussed an Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) spoofing 
based Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack [6]. Wei et al. 
performed a study on modeling Denial-of-Service (DoS)-
resilient communication routing in the smart grid [7]. Etigowni 
et al. presented a cyber-physical access control solution by 
using information flow analysis based on mathematical models 
of the physical grid to generate policies enforced through 
verifiable logic [8]. Furthermore, Sgouras et al. made an 
attempt to assess the impact of cyber-attacks on the Advanced 
Metering Infrastructure (AMI), specifically considering Denial-
of-Service (DoS) and Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks [9]. 
Hahn et al. introduced a security model to represent privilege 
states and evaluated viable attack paths in the AMI network 
[10]. Liu et al. analyzed the impacts of a line outage attack, 
DoS attack, and MITM attack on the physical power grid using 
an integrated cyber-power modeling and simulation testbed 
[11]. 
The above mentioned solutions have limitations, which 
could be further improved. In [5], [6], [9], [10] and [8], the 
impact of attacks on the power system was not studied, 
whereas the scheme in [4] does not consider the source of the 
cyber-attacks as being from the communication network, rather 
directly injected into the power system. The simulation work in 
[7] only included a 3-generator system, which is small to fully 
understand the impact of these attacks on real power systems. 
The studies of cyber-physical systems found in the 
literature are based on attacks, such as MITM, DoS, and DDoS. 
These attacks are achieved by injecting false data or targeting 
the device to stop its functionality. However, there is no study 
carried out for malicious/false command injection in the smart 
grid, where an adversary can potentially isolate the critical 
power components by disconnecting them from the rest of the 
power system [3].  
We developed an integrated cyber-physical tool from our 
previous work [12] to tackle the issue of impact monitoring of 
the cyber-physical system. This simulation tool can contribute 
in academia as well as industry as follows:  
1. The developed tool helps in learning and understanding 
the nature of cyber-attacks, and models them using the 
technology under smart grid environment consisting of 
several power and communication devices and 
components. 
2. The tool provides a broad understanding of setting 
different network topologies to analyze communication 
network for the smart grid in a better way. 
3. The tool supports understanding and evaluation of power 
system activities and routine operations, such as power 
flow and contingency analysis. 
4. The tool maps the behavior of cyber-attacks into the 
dynamics of power system measurements, and can be 
used in effectively improving the understanding of 
integrated cyber-physical smart grid security. 
5. The tool helps in monitoring and evaluating the impact 
of cyber-attacks on the physical power system. This 
provides a greater understanding of this impact on 
individual power component as well as on the power 
system as a whole. The tool maintains communication 
logs, received and sent power system measurement data, 
and triggered control commands as well as generates 
security metrics to understand the critical and non-
critical components in the system. 
6. The tool provides insight to offer a reasonably better 
training and awareness guidelines to the technical as well 
as non-technical people. It will enable the operators to 
further develop their decision making skills. So, we can 
better prepare the students for this role in the future. 
III. CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEM SECURITY CHALLENGES IN 
EDUCATION AND TRAINING 
The smart grid system is cyber-controlled through an 
integration of the communications networks, embedded 
systems and software applications. It is therefore important to 
understand the interdependencies in an integrated cyber-
physical system environment. However, this is a big challenge 
to resolve due to the unavailability or shortage of cyber-
physical simulation tools, and consequently difficult to analyze 
and include in for the education and training purposes. 
Existing simulators on the market independently simulate 
either the power system or the communications network [12]. 
For example, PowerWorld [13] is a dedicated power system 
simulator that simulates power systems dynamics and 
operations, but assumes ideal communication conditions in the 
communications layer. NS2/3, on the other hand, is dedicated 
communication network simulator that simulates 
communication network dynamics, but is incapable of 
simulating power system [14]. An integrated cyber-physical 
co-simulator must be able to model and simulate the power 
system as well as the communication system simultaneously in 
addition to providing functionalities for assessing cyber-
physical security. 
Cyber-attacks can affect the normal operation of power 
system applications, such as demand response. These attacks 
can also affect the decision making capability of a system 
operator, which can lead to cascading failures and instability in 
the grid. Compromised confidential power system information 
can lead to perform inappropriate actions by the operators. 
Cyber-physical attacks can result in permanent physical 
damage to power devices in the field. We should be able to 
model the nature and behavior of these attacks, and learn from 
their simulation. Different attack situations need to be captured 
and analyzed underlying communication network. System 
misbehavior on the power or communication network system 
may compromise power system data and may disrupt control 
devices. The current state and overall health of the power 
system can also be affected by attacks over the communication 
network. During these attacks, the power system may undergo 
various state transitions and eventually become insecure. 
In addition to this, there are certain specific challenges that 
make the study of cyber-physical system more difficult, which 
are (i) scalability: due to the involvement of a large number of 
devices, (ii) simulation tool: due to the limitations of the 
existing simulation tools and the shortage of integrated cyber-
physical simulation tool, (iii) applying critical thinking: 
modeling and detecting changes in the physical system targeted 
from the cyberspace are not straight forward and require 
expertise in both domains, and (iv) human element: as we 
know humans are the weakest link in security, they can mistake 
in designing and understanding the complex systems. But in 
order to understand and analyze the cyber-physical system, 
integrated tools need to be developed. The university education 
needs to be upgraded with the latest attack scenarios and 
advancements in the cyber-physical system using such tools. 
Similarly, the staff training programmes also need to be revised 
for better understanding of the nature of recent attacks and the 
techniques used by the cyber criminals to trigger these attacks. 
This will surely improve the human aspect of the system, and 
users will learn from their or others’ mistakes. 
A typical example for understanding the complexity of 
cyber-physical smart grid system is given below, where a false 
but legitimate command can potentially damage the power 
system operations, and is difficult to catch the fact that the 
command sent was false [3]. 
Use Case: The attacker can impersonate the 
communication network and sends a false (unwanted) but a 
legitimate command to the circuit breaker of the largest 
generator at a substation. Here, we try to understand its 
potential impact on the power system, and design a solution 
that addresses the issue of injecting a malicious command or a 
legitimate but false command over the communication 
network. 
Effects on the Communication Network: Under this attack, 
we can observe and monitor several effects on the 
communication network, such as: (a) the deployed Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) notifies the control center operator the 
type of command it received and the operator verifies whether 
the command is legitimate, and (b) a false command was 
issued to the substation device connected to the breaker of the 
targeted generator. 
Effects on the Power System: If this attack is successful, we 
can observe the following impact on the power system: (a) 
insecure operation(s) of the power system, and (b) possible 
shedding of electrical load. 
Steps: The following steps are involved in the presented use 
case to address the issue: 
1. The attacker sends a false but legitimate command from 
an external location to the generator breaker over an 
insecure network. 
2. The IDS detects a suspicious malicious command 
(based on its rules engine, such as IP address, port 
number, etc.) and notifies the operator. The operator 
verifies that the control center did not issue this 
command. 
3. The developed tool performs power flow and cyber-
physical contingency analysis to evaluate the effect of 
the command on the power system if it was allowed to 
go through. The tool discovers that the system is in an 
insecure state indicating that the command was 
malicious in the sense that it was not sent from the 
control center. 
4. The operator discards the command, and the secure 
system operation is restored back. 
IV. CONTEXTUAL LEARNING REQUIREMENTS 
This section covers contextual learning requirements for 
both, education as well as training purposes. Following are the 
expected requirements from a simulation tool to provide a clear 
understanding of the cyber-physical system security. 
Technically, the tool must contribute to educational learning as 
well as technical and non-technical training to the utility staff. 
The tool should: 
1. Be able to detect real-time cyber security situations. This 
can be achieved by comparing the normal system 
behavior with the situations under attack.  
2. Provide monitoring and control capabilities to the 
operators and system administrators. 
3. Detect possible contingencies that can occur in the 
system as a result of a specific cyber-attack and analyze 
them. 
4. Enhance the security and resilience of the power system 
by suggesting appropriate operator actions under attack 
scenarios. 
5. Generate historical logs and trust metrics for different 
power and communication components and identify 
weak elements in the system, which helps operators to 
respond quickly when a similar situation occurs at 
repeated locations. 
6. Apply user-generated rules for the normal operating 
range to better understand the behavior and normal state 
of the integrated cyber-physical system. 
7. Identify and assess the current health of the cyber-
physical-system by performing cyber-physical 
contingency analysis, and suggest the appropriate actions 
to take into account. 
8. Suggest and enable an extra layer of security, i.e., 
hashing or encrypting the commands or critical 
measurements [15]. 
V. UTILIZING SIMULATION TOOL IN EDUCATION AND 
TRAINING 
Simulation is an effective way of working with very large 
problems that would otherwise require involvement of a large 
number of active users, devices and other resources, which is 
difficult to coordinate and build in a large-scale research 
environment for the purpose of investigation. In this section, 
we discuss an integrated cyber-physical security co-simulator 
tool capable of Cyber-Physical Security Assessment (CPSA) 
[12] and address how can this tool be used in education and 
training to better understand the cyber-physical system 
security. 
We cover both aspects of the learning: (i) education aspect 
that reflects how we can improvise the existing knowledge and 
understanding in academia (at universities and schools), and 
(ii) training and awareness aspect that improves the cyber 
security understanding of the technical and non-technical staff, 
such as electrical engineers, computer operators, and other staff 
at the substation. 
Attacks modelling and the measurement simulation using 
CPSA tool are shown in Figure 1. Similarly, Figure 2 
represents commands simulation using tool and understanding 
their impact on the power system. 
 
Fig. 1. CPSA tool for attacks modelling and data measurement simulation.  
 
Fig. 2. Simulating commands and understanding their impact on the power 
system.  
A. How can we understand the behavior and nature of cyber-
attacks? 
The tool models and helps to understand the possible cyber-
attack scenarios. At present the tool works with four attack 
scenarios: bad data injection, malicious command injection, 
DoS, and communication delay attacks. In addition to these 
attack scenarios, the simulation tool can be extended to model 
replay, impersonation, and other attacks. This covers not only 
the theoretical aspect of attack modeling and logical 
communication of data flow, but also provides an 
implementation aspect to model these attacks using 
technologies, such as Java, MATLAB, and PowerWorld. In 
order to gain insight and better understanding on the inter-
dependencies in the system, the tool can be used to provide in-
house training and awareness to the power utility staff. The tool 
models overall cyber-physical control loop including operator 
decisions under attack scenarios, which very much covers the 
training and awareness aspect to the technical staff.  
B. How to understand security logs and forensic analysis to 
verify an attack footprint? 
The tool provides the capabilities to aggregate, normalize 
and index the log files acquired from the different components. 
Upon successful detection of a security incident, the relevant 
Indicators of Compromise (IoC) are used to correlate and 
search the log files in order to allow the forensic analyst to 
construct a timeline of events and identify further indicators 
that will lead to attribution, that is, to identify the source of the 
attack and the impact the attack had upon the affected asset. 
The security incidents extracted from the log files can be also 
fed into Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) 
tools, such as Alienvault and Aplunk as well as general 
purpose analysis tools like Kibana and Elasticsearch. The 
educational aspect includes the understanding of these related 
tools and improving the accuracy to decide and detect 
indicators of compromise. The training aspect includes the 
detection of different attacks’ footprint, i.e., source of the 
attack and its impact on the system, from the log files 
indicating the timeline of events, and then utilizing other tools 
for incident analysis. 
C. How can we understand and evaluate the impact of cyber-
attacks on the power system? 
To better understand the impact of cyber-attacks on the 
power system, the tool maps communication network changed 
parameters (due to an attack) to power system dynamics 
through an interface. The tool supports the implementation of 
the communication network in Java, power system dynamics 
using PowerWorld, and the interface using MATLAB. This 
interface keeps a closed eye in the program segment where this 
mapping takes place and the parameters need to change and 
pass to the power system for evaluating the current state of the 
system with the changed values. The educational aspect 
includes the functionality and implementation details of this 
interface to map the received physical values from the 
communication network to the power system. The training 
aspect covers the generation of new files containing the power 
system dynamics before and after passing changed values to 
the PowerWorld. 
D. What is an effective way and how can we perform power 
system monitoring? 
The tool provides the operator with an interface to monitor 
the behavior of the power system. The tool also generates 
system residuals and Aggregate MW Contingency Overload 
(AMWCO) matrices in order to evaluate the security and 
health of the power system. The tool can support dynamic 
power system topology having power components ranged from 
several hundreds to a thousand. The education aspect improves 
the understanding of the functioning and details of global state 
estimation, power flow, and contingency analysis, whereas the 
training aspect covers functionalities and simulation details for 
global state estimation, power flow, and contingency analysis. 
The purpose of state estimation is to identify the most likely 
state (bus voltage magnitudes and angles) of the power system 
using the measurements received from the devices in the field. 
Power flow determines the system state based on bus 
injections, and the obtained results serve as the base scenario 
for subsequent contingency analysis. Contingency analysis 
evaluates the impact of possible physical contingencies on the 
power system in terms of line thermal overload. 
The tool can handle a small power system case with a few 
tens of buses to a large system with ten thousand buses. The 
tool is capable of monitoring the real-time system behavior (by 
comparing the current state of the system with the baseline 
under normal behavior) as well as the impact of cyber-attacks 
on the power system (by generating a couple of security 
metrics, and keeping history of communications logs). 
E. How to understand and detect malicious measurement 
data? 
The tool models a scenario of MITM attack under which an 
adversary can perform bad data injection attack on the power 
system. The education aspect involves the modeling and 
understanding of first performing MITM attack over the 
communication network to alter the measurement data, and 
then modify a specific or few values (within threshold or 
outside the range) of the measurements of a specific bus (with 
attached generators and loads), such as voltage, active power, 
reactive power, and angle. The tool supports Distributed 
Network Protocol (DNP3) packet format for transmitting the 
measurement data. The training aspect covers the 
understanding of system behavior when the malicious data are 
allowed vs. disallowed to the power system. The system 
generates output files to observe the changes in the final values 
for each bus in the system. Depending upon the outcomes, the 
operator makes a decision where to pass suspected malicious 
data into the real power system or just discard the received 
packets with such values. 
F. How can the system detect malicious control command 
and ensure the transmission of legitimate command 
delivery? 
Generally, the operator executes control commands to 
different power components at the substation as part of its 
routine and emergency operations. An attacker can modify the 
transmitted command over the insecure network to perform a 
specific action, such as opening a circuit breaker, detaching a 
generator, and shedding load. The education scenario involves 
the understanding of malicious command, which could be a 
legitimate but false (wanted) command. In order to detect a 
malicious command, the system deploys an IDS with filtering 
rules based on different parameters, such as the IP address of 
the source, port number, and frequency of the same command 
triggered in a specific time interval. The IDS sends a 
notification to the operator, and the operator can decide 
whether to allow or disallow a command to execute on the real 
power system.  The training scenario includes the awareness of 
such complex scenarios where a command is legitimate but 
unwanted or forged. It also includes the understanding of IDS 
filtering rules and understands the impact of suspicious 
command by simulating it using the tool, and depending upon 
the modified state of the power system, a command can be 
allowed or not. The tool can use digital signatures to ensure the 
authentic delivery of legitimate commands only [16]. 
G. How can the system understand and detect that a device is 
disabled (possibly due to a DoS attack) and is not 
functioning at a remote substation? 
There could be situations where a device deployed in the 
field stopped working (possibly due to an attack, say, DoS), 
and does not send measurement data to the control center for 
some times. Hence, measurements from the substation are 
unavailable for state estimation. The tool may still provide 
global observability, since the system may have sufficient 
measurements in other parts. If several substation devices are 
under DoS attacks, the state estimator will lose observability 
into at least a portion of, if not the entire system. In this 
situation, it is difficult to provide any input to other energy 
functions, such as power flow, contingency analysis, and 
optimal power flow. The education aspect involves the 
understanding of such scenarios and techniques for 
observability analysis. The training aspect includes the 
detection of such as an attack using the tool and guide 
operators to take immediate action in order to mitigate the 
impact of such an attack on the power system. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we highlighted the need of understanding 
cyber-physical system security. We emphasize the role of 
human factors and their mistakes, which call the need for 
improvements in understanding the cyber security by the 
general public as well as technical and non-technical staff at 
utility. The understanding of cyber-physical system security 
can be enhanced by attacks modeling and evaluating the impact 
of cyber-attacks on the power system. We highlighted that 
CPSA tool can be used for educational purpose to improve the 
skills and knowledge of the university students and researchers. 
Subsequently, they can develop new tools and techniques for 
security analysis of the future cyber-physical systems. The 
CPSA tool can also be used for training purpose to the 
operators and other staff at utility. Much effort needs to be 
made in order to spread cyber security awareness and cyber-
attack impact monitoring of the real physical system, such as 
the power grid. 
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